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The Promise of Participation
Susan P. Sturm*
INTRODUCTION

Professor Owen Fiss's seminal work, The Civil Rights Injunction, 1
inspired a generation of scholars and practitioners to flesh out the
significance of his insights. With remarkable prescience, he captured a
moment in intellectual and legal history and created a vocabulary that
continues to shape the debate over the court's role in public law litigation.
The Allure of Individualism2 continues the Fiss tradition of capturing a
singular, emblematic issue and sketching with broad strokes the contours of
emerging debate. His springboard is Martin v. Wilks, 3 a case that aptly
frames the current dilemmas and choices posed by structural injunction
litigation.4 Martin v. Wilks addresses a central issue raised by structural
injunctions: To what extent must courts afford those whose interests may
be adversely affected by a decree the opportunity to participate in its
formulation and implementation? 5
Martin v. Wilks answers this question by granting third parties the right
to full adversary participation. It holds that white firefighters may collaterally attack a consent decree adopting an affirmative action plan if they did
not participate as parties in the proceedings resulting in that decree. The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 6 reverses this holding and recasts third parties'
right to "individual participation" as a right to "interest representation": It
precludes collateral attacks if third parties had notice and a reasonable
opportunity to object or if someone who previously challenged the judgment adequately represented their interests.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I want to thank Colin
Diver, Lani Guinier, and Martha Minow for our ongoing conversation about public law
remedies and their invaluable comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this Article.
Ann Bartow provided outstanding editorial assistance. I also want to thank Peter Shane for
putting together the panel discussion at the Remedies section of the 1993 meeting of the
American Association of Law Schools that led to this Article and Owen Fiss and Douglas
Laycock for their thoughtful presentations and comments at that meeting.
1. Owen M. Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction (1978).
2. Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 965 (1993).
3. 490 U.S. 755,(1989).
4. Professor Fiss defines structural injunctions as decrees "through which the judiciary
seeks to reorganize ongo\ng bureaucratic organizations so as to bring them into conformity
with the Constitution." Fiss, supra note 2, at 965. In this Article, I use the term interchangeably
with "public law remedies" to refer to a class of cases seeking to change the policies, practices,
and conditions of institutions, such as schools, prisons, mental health facilities, and places of
employment, to conform with legal norms.
5. These individuals are typically referred to as "third parties." This Article questions the
appropriateness of the term "third party" as a way of describing everyone interested in the
public remedial process. See infra pp. 987-91. It does use the term where its generally accepted
meaning in fact applies.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n)(I) (Supp. III 1991).
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Professor Fiss does not shrink from the potentially far-reaching
implications of Martin v. Wilks. He quite correctly notes that, although
Martin v. Wilks involves a consent decree, its reasoning is equally applicable
'to decrees following an adjudication of liability. 7 He also acknowledges the
implicit due process foundations of the Court's decision. Indeed, much of
the commentary on the issue of third-party challenges to injunctions
proceeds in terms of the traditional due process rights of third parties.8 The
strains of constitutional analysis in Martin v. Wilks implicate the rights of
third parties to challenge injunctions not addressed by the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, and leave open the possibility that the procedures established by
the Civil Rights Act do not conform to the requisites of due process.
Professor Fiss uses the stark opposition of Martin v. Wilks and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 to highlight what he perceives as an inevitable conflict
between process and outcome, between participation values and the
efficacy and finality of the structural injunction. He embraces the value
choice embodied by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Indeed, The Allure of
Individualism serves in part as an effort to provide a normative justification
for the political' victory achieved by the legislature's reversal of Martin v.
Wilks. Professor Fiss introduces and defends a scheme that I refer to as
"vicarious interest representation." Third parties may participate through a
surrogate whom they did not select and cannot hold accountable, but who
the court deems an adequate representative. Fiss concedes that this

7. Fiss, supra note 2, at 968. Professor Fiss apparently agrees with the result reached by
the Court in Martin v. Wilks because of his discomfort with the consent decrees as a mode of
dispute resolution. He argues that consent decrees should be treated as no more than contracts
between two private parties and should thus have no binding effect on third parties. I disagree
with Professor Laycock's suggestion that Professor Fiss's concession concerning consent
decrees dramatically limits the significance of his argument. Although structural injunctions
do create incentives for parties to negotiate consensual agreements, decisions by judges
imposing structural relief over the objection of parties (and others) fill the federal reporters.
See, e.g., United States v. qity of Yonkers, 845 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988) rev'd in part sub nom.
Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990) (housing discrimination); Davis v. East Baton
Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 721 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983) (schools); Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (employer); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265
(S.D. Tex. 1980), affd, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) (prisons). Moreover, the status of
consensual decrees that emerge following an adjudication of liability and an order by the court
to prepare an injunction has never been clarified.
In any case, I disagree with Professor Fiss's blanket assertion that all consent decrees are to
be treated with the same finality as a contract, regardless of the adequacy of the process
leading to their adoption. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale LJ. 1073, 1085
(1984). As Laycock points out, Professor Fiss's insistence on litigated decrees guarantees the
failure of structural injunctions. See Douglas Laycock, Due Process of Law in Trilateral
Disputes, 78 Iowa L. Rev. lOll, 1012-13 (1993). Moreover, a self-conscious and judicially
structured process of deliberation offers a legitimate normative framework for upholding and
enforcing consent decrees as a form of injunction. I develop this theory supporting the
legitimacy of consent decrees in a forthcoming article.
8. See Samuel Issacharoff, When Substance Mandates Procedure: Martin v. Wilks and the
Rights of Vested Incumbents in Civil Rights Consent Decrees, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 189, 200
(1992); Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 321,
331 (1988); Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights ofNonconsenting Third Parties, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 103, 105-10.
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approach deprives third parties of important aspects of participation, but is
willing to sacrifice these values to preserve the effectiveness of the structural injunction.
This Article shows that the value conflict identified by Professor Fiss
stems not from an inevitable clash between process and outcome, but from
his unstated acceptance of a variety of premises about the nature of
participation and representation at the remedial stage of public law
litigation. He conflates a series of important questions and choices that
must be unpacked to address adequately the issue of third-party participation in structural injunctions.
First, is a distinct normative theory of participation needed for the
remedial stage of public law litigation to· account for basic differences in the
goals and demands of liability and remedial decision making? Professor
Fiss's treatment of third parties assumes that ·the theory and form of
participation designed for liability determinations necessarily govern the
public remedial process. I argue that this approach overlooks the importance of institutional context in defining the values and processes of
participation. The distinctive character of public remedial decision making
suggests the need for an independent theory of participation grounded in
that judicial role. The values and forms of participation which characterize
liability determinations respond poorly to the demands of an evolving
remedial practice. That practice frequently departs from the adversary
model and strives to develop and implement effective, fair, and consensual
remedial solutions. 9
Second, what participation values are important at the remedial stage
of decision making? Professor Fiss enumerates the two values of participation embraced by Martin v. Wilks: the dignitary value of preserving
individual autonomy and the instrumental value of achieving accurate
decisions. He assumes that these two values define the universe of participation values implicated by remedial decision making, and he justifies
departing from these values by downplaying the significance of instrumental values generally and minimizing the importance of dignitary values in
the context of structural injunctions. This Article suggests that the ongoing
debate over process values fails to address the demands of remedial
participation. It offers five participation values for public remedial decision
making and begins the task of rethinking the dignitary theory of participation in the context of structural remedies implicating group interests.
Third, what form best accommodates the values of remedial participation? Professor Fiss, like most courts and commentators, assumes that
participation requires engagement in full adversary process. I argue that
the adversary model cannot realize the process values at stake in the public
remedial context. More interactive forms of participation are both possible
and crucial to achieving remedial legitimacy and success.
9. In most cases, the process of developing, monitoring; and enforcing a remedy departs
dramatically from the adversary model.Judges and parties use mediation, expert consultation,
and other informal modes of fact finding and problem solving. See generally Susan Sturm, A
Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 Geo. L.J. 1355 (1991).
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Finally, what role does representation play in fulfilling the participation values relevant in public remedial decision making? Professor Fiss
proposes a move from direct participation to vicarious interest representation without justifying this move with any explicit theory of representation.
He fails to show what makes a particular individual representative of the
group he or she purportedly represents and does not even discuss what the
representative must do to fulfill his or her responsibilities as representative.
I explore a more dynamic and explicit theory of representation grounded
in the remedial context which bridges the individual and group interests
implicated in structural injunctions.
These four questions provide a framework for assessing the adequacy
of Professor Fiss's treatment of third-party participation in structural
injunctions. This Article analyzes the traditional conception of the terms
"third party" and "finality," demonstrates Professor Fiss's general preoccupation with the liability model of decision making, and sets forth the basis
for a distinct normative theory of public remedial process. It then criticizes
Fiss's liability-driven approach to participation and representation and
outlines a more promising theory and form for the public remedial context.

I. THE LIABILITY-BASED PARADIGM FOR PARTICIPATION
Martin v. Wilks held that plaintiffs must either join third parties who
will be adversely affected by a decree or face third-party-challenges to the
decree in subsequent proceedings. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist based this judgment on the Court's "deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court." 10 Although the
opinion does not spell out what it means to have one's own "day in court," 11
its language and use of the term conjure up visions of full adversary
hearings with discovery, presentation and cross-examination of witnesses,
briefing, and opportunity to appeal. 12 Only after a person has become a
party and participated in this sense can she be bound by a court order.
Professor Lon Fuller explained the widely shared view that participation values are inextricably linked to adversary process: "The distinguishing
characteristic of adjudication lies in the fact that it confers on the party a
peculiar form of participation in the decision, that of presenting proofs and
reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor." 13 Two theories of
10. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762.
11. For a discussion suggesting that the Court has failed to articulate a general theory of
participation supporting the "day-in-court" principle animating its decision in Martin v. Wilks,
see Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonpany Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 193, 204 (1992).
12. Indeed, the Birmingham Firefighters Association did appear and file objections as
amicus curiae at the initial hearing on the consent decree, and the district court considered its
objections. However, the district court denied its motion for intervention as untimely, and thus
the court did nornfford it formal party status, and it did not have the right to appeal. Martin
v. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 759. Even if the Birmingham Firefighters Association was deemed to
represent the interests of the white firefighters who filed suit in Martin v. Wilks, the more
limited form of participation afforded by the trial court would not satisfy Rehnquist's
conception of having its "day in court."
13. Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 364 (1978).
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participation have emerged as the justification for this insistence on the
right to one's "day in court." First, participation respects the dignity of the
individual by providing those affected by decisions a "formally guaranteed
opportunity to affect those decisions." 14 Second, participation serves the
instrumental value of accuracy. Adversarial presentation by parties' lawyers
enhances the likelihood of reaching a correct decision. 15 In his opinion,
Chief Justice Rehnquist implicitly embraces this adversary conception of
participation and applies it to each individual "who could be adversely
affected by a decree granting broad remedial relief." 16 Unless an individual
has been formally heard as a party, she remains free to challenge the court
decree in the future.
Professor Fiss, along with many in the civil rights community, reacted
to Martin v. Wilks with alarm.17 He characterizes the Court's insistence on
formal participation as a threat to the viability of the structural injunction.
Professor Fiss shares Rehnquist's commitment to the value of formal
participation 18 and accepts without comment the traditional "day in court"
paradigm of participation articulated in Martin v. Wilks.
However, Professor Fiss despairs of preserving participation values
without sacrificing the finality and efficacy of the structural injunction. The
decree's vulnerability to collateral attacks and the resulting delay
in implementation "exposes every decree to ... an almost endless series
of challenges." Consequently, "[i]n order to achieve some measure of
finality and efficacy .... It may be necessary to forgo the right of
participation ... ,"19

14. Lon Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. Rev. 3, 36; see also
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970) (stating that participation "foster[s] the dignity
and well-being of all persons"); Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State
161-62 (1985); Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Due Process, in Due
Process: Nomos XVII 127-28 (J. Roland Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1977) (identifying
importance of having "played a part in [and] made one's apt contribution to, decisions which
are about oneselP').
Some commentators challenge the validity of a dignitary theory of due process and question
the significance of dignitary values independent of their instrumental importance in achieving
accurate decisions. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 101-03 (1985); Lawrence
Alexander, The Relationship Between Procedural Due Process and Substantive Constitutional
Rights, 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 323, 325-26, 341-43 (1987); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C.
Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 Yale LJ.
455, 484-85 (1986). Others have questioned whether the values of individual autonomy and
dignity can be served through the adversary process. Mashaw, supra, at 180; Cynthia Farina,
Conceiving Due Process, 3 Yale J.L. & Feminism 189, 219-20 (1991); Michelman, supra, at
127-28. Despite these reservations, commentators are drawn to the intuitive appeal of
, dignitary theory of process, and the decision in Martin v. Wilks suggests that the Supreme
Court credits individual dignity as an important and intrinsic process value.
15. Mashaw, supra note 14, at 102-03; Owen Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
Harv. L. Rev. l, 42 (1979); Fuller, supra note 13, at 366-67.
16. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 767.
17. See S. Rep. No. 315, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1990).
18. See Fiss, supra note 2, at 968 (reflecting Fiss's assumption that participation requires
full adversary process).
19. Fiss, supra note 2, at 969, 979.
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Faced with what he perceives as a choice between two irreconcilable
values, Professor Fiss comes down on the side of the structural injunction.
He proposes to compromise the participation value by moving from
individual to vicarious interest representation. Third parties participate
vicariously through a surrogate identified by the court as having similar
interests. Individuals do not have a right of participation in the process
unless no member of the group the court deems them to be a part of has
participated. They need have no involvement in selecting their representative or holding her accountable.
Professor Fiss thus accepts Chief Justice Rehnquist's equation of
participation with adversary process, but seeks to limit this right to vicarious
representation to preserve the effectiveness of the structural injunction.
Professor Fiss's solution closely tracks the approach adopted by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. The Act precludes challenges to consent and litigated
decrees if a person had notice of the proposed order and an opportunity to
present objections or if a similarly situated person who previously challenged the judgment on the same legal and factual grounds adequately
represented the potential challenger's interests.2°
Professor Fiss argues that this approach solves many of the problems
created by Martin v. Wilks. In his view, it avoids the necessity of joining the
"countless" people whom the injunction might affect. It binds future
persons whom the court cannot identify when it enters its decree. It
encourages early participation by those whom the decree may adversely
affect. According to Professor Fiss, by achieving formal finality and
precluding future collateral attacks, the vicarious interest representation
model satisfies the values of finality and efficacy, albeit at the expense of
participation.
The strength of Professor Fiss's posttion depends on formalistic,
liability-driven conceptions of party, finality, representation, and participation. However, if examined in relation to the particular character and
demands of the remedial process, his vicarious interest participation model
fails, even on his own terms. It ignores critical issues concerning the scope
and form of participation by third parties in su-uctural injunctions. It does
not meet the stated concerns of finality and efficacy which prompt
Professor Fiss to depart from traditional due process. Professor Fiss's
proposal Jacks a coherent theory of representation to justify its departure
from individual participation. Moreover, like the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
it fails to provide standards to determine whether the representative had a
meaningful opportunity to participate or whether she was in fact representative of the putative challenger. Finally, it fails to account for the distinct
values served by participation at the remedial stage which are necessary to
achieve effective implementation and preserve the legitimacy of the court.

20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n)(l) (Supp. III 1991).

PROMISE OF PARTICIPATION

A.

987

From Third Party to Stakeholder: Liability- Versus Remedy-Type
Claims for Participation

In Martin v. Wilks white firefighters challenged the legality of a consent
decree that adopted hiring and promotion goals for black firefighters. The
white firefighters claimed that the city's employment practices pursuant to
the decree violated Title VIJ.2 1 They did not claim a legal violation
independent of the decree, but their third-party challenge essentially
sought a liability-type determination: Did the remedy itself violate the legal
rights of third parties? The white firefighters thus claimed the right to the
process afforded to any party seeking an adjudication of fault and responsibility under our current system of judicial process-full adversary adjudication of their legal claims.22
The liability-based challenge of the white firefighters differs from the
position of many third parties at the remedial stage of public law litigation.
As both Professor Fiss and Chief Justice Rehnquist recognize, public law
remedies affect many people who lack valid independent legal claims but
have important concerns grounded in less formal interests. They may be in
a position to block the remedy, may be profoundly affected by it, or may be
needed to implement it, although they are not necessarily legally responsible:
Consider, for example, the number of people affected by the
typical school desegregation decree: every child and family in the
school district; teachers and administrators; residents and shopkeepers in the areas close to the schools; police and transportation
officials who will have their schedules and work loads affected;
and of course, the taxpayers who will have to shoulder the
financial burden <?f the busing plan.23
21. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 759.
22. I do not suggest that the adversary process is the only or even the best way to address
conflicts over liability. A number of commentators, particularly those drawing on feminist
theory, claim that the adversary process cannot satisfy the participation values that underlie
our concern for due process and urge a more general "re-vision" of the structure of judicial
process that builds on an ethic of care and develops "a flexible, contextually-sensitive due
process jurisprudence." Farina, supra note 14, at 269; see also Martha Minow, Interpreting
Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 Yale L.J. 1860, 1&76 (1987); Deborah L. Rhode,
Feminist Legal Theories, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 617, 631 (1990).
I share this dissatisfaction with the adversary process as a means of resolving all legal
disputes, even those that involve multiple parties, require interpreting general, aspirational
legal norms, involve competing theories of causation, and offer the possibility of more
textured and Solomonic solutions that respond to the multiple concerns and perspectives
affected by public law issues. Indeed, in a forthcoming article, I explore the potential of
conse!}t decrees as a form for expanding our repertoire of legitimate judicial role beyond the
adversary model. However, my argument in this Article is much less ambitious and farreaching. I am suggesting that we acknowledge and embrace the distinctive character of
remedial decision making that has already promoted a departure from the adversary process
in most cases. See Sturm, supra note 9, at 1360-78 (describing the distinctive character of public
remedial decision making and the ways in which the process of public remedial decision
making departs from the adversary model).
23. Fiss, supra note 2, at 969-70; see Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 766 (recognizing "the sort
of complexities .that may arise from a decree affecting numerous people in different ways").
For those wedded to a liability conception of process, it may be difficult to imagine a

988

78

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[1993]

Martin v. Wilks and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 essentially lump all of
these third parties together in terms of the nature of their right of
participation. Rehnquist includes "those who could be adversely affected by
a decree granting broad relief,"24 in his discussion of third parties and states
that all third parties should have their "day in court." This suggests the
necessity of formal adversary hearings to satisfy the requirement of
participation regardless of the nature of the third-party interest. Similarly,
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 removes the requirement of formal party
participation for all third parties-those asserting liability-type remedial
challenges and those seeking to change the terms of the deo·ee to protect
their interests,2 5 Professor Fiss's solution also equates liability- and remedydriven challenges to structural injunctions and reverses Martin v. Wilks for
both. He would abolish the requirement of participation for those asserting
cognizable legal claims and for those seeking to P.rotect their interests.26
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Professor Fiss, and the Civil Rights Act of
1991 all ignore a critical difference in the form and purpose of participation
for the white firefighters in Martin v. Wilks and the families of school
children seeking to participate in the formulation of a school desegregation
plan. They fail to appreciate the distinctive character of remedial decision
making and the resulting implications for the nature and role of remedial
participation. The firefighters are asserting legal rights to invalidate a
remedy. Their arguments involve the bread-and-butter of formal adjudication: interpretation oflegal doctrine and the application oflegal doctrine
to controverted facts. In contrast, the school children are engaging in the
task of formulating a fair and effective remedy. 27 Their involvement does
not consist of presenting arguments grounded in liability norms, which
provide only the goals and boundaries for the remedial decision. They seek
to influence the choice of remedy based on its potential impact on values
Martin-type challenge ever arising except as a liability-type claim. However, there are many
examples of third parties seeking to challenge the content of remedial decrees on the grounds
that these decrees adversely affect their interests. A good example is the unsuccessful attempt
of the Philadelphia District Attorney to intervene to challenge a consent decree establishing
mandatory population caps on the ground that the decree adversely affected the interests of
the citizens in upholding the criminal laws. See Harris v. Pemsley, 654 F. Supp. 1042, 1045
(E.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 820 F.2d 592 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 947 (1987); see also
United States v. Crucial, 722 F.2d 1182, 1190-91 (5th Cir. 1983) (allowing intervention to
separate organization of parents to protect the educational interests of minority students);
Berkman v. City of New York, 705 F.2d 584, 588 (2d Cir. 1983) (firefighters' union allowed
to intervene at remedial stage of Title VII case to participate in design of nondiscriminatory
firefighters' test).
24. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 767.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n)(l)(B) (Supp. III 1991).
26. Professor Fiss acknowledges the ambiguity in "Rehnquist's conception of the universe
of persons to be joined," Fiss, supra note 2, at 970, but insists that even if Martin v. Wilks'
joinder requirement is limited to those with cognizable legal claims, it imposes an insurmountable burden on plaintiffs. Contrary to Professor Fiss's rhetorical suggestion that any interest
can be transformed into a cognizable legal claim, most third parties who participate in
structural injunction cases do not have cognizable challenges to the legality of the remedy. I
consider Professor Fiss's limiting interpretation on the scope of plaintiffs' joinder requirement
to ease substantially plaintiffs' burden and thus to undercut the force of Professor Fiss's claim
that Martin v. Wilks destroys the finality and efficacy of the structural injunction.
27. See Sturm, supra note 9, at 1363-65.
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and goals that do not directly relate to the liability norm, such as promoting
effectiveness, preserving community-based education, and enhancing educational value.
Remedial legitimacy comes not from finding and proclaiming the right
result, but from overseeing a process that is fair and that produces effective
results. Unlike the process of liability determination, the structural injunction's successful implementation depends on the cooperation of those who
must implement, support, and live with it. The remedial stage poses the
challenge of achieving the understanding and acceptance of the remedy by
those who are affected by it. The parties' perception of the legitimacy of the
court's intervention is crucial to achieving cooperation in a particular case
and to maintaining the legitimacy of judicial involvement.
Professor Laycock, in his article commenting on Professor Fiss's The
Allure of Individualism,28 recognizes the existence of a difference between
liability- and remedy-driven challenges by third parties, but fails to appreciate the significance of that difference. The distinction prompts him to
assert that only those with arguable legal claims need participate in the
remedial process or have the opportunity to challenge a decree. 29 In part,
this conclusion results from a narrow reading of Martin v. Wilks, perhaps an
effort to minimize its reach by limiting the holding to the facts. As Professor
Laycock points out, Chief Justice Rehnquist does refer at the beginning of
the opinion to "the general rule that a person cannot be deprived of his
legal rights in a proceeding to which he is not a party,"30 and the party
before the Court was asserting legal rights. However, the Court's discussion
and justification of the holding refer repeatedly to the variety of ways a
decree may affect third parties, and explicitly address and accept the
potential consequences of a rule that applies to third parties "who could be
adversely affected by a decree granting broad remedial relief."31 Certainly
the drafters of the Civil Rights Act read Martin v. Wilks as applying to all
third parties seeking to challenge a decree.
Laycock's minimization of the interests of third parties with remedybased challenges to decrees illustrates our preoccupation with the liability
stage. Laycock characterizes participation by third parties with remedydriven claims as "good politics," but legally unnecessary; only when a court
is disposing of claims of right will we recognize judicial process norms.32
This approach reflects a formalistic and incomplete conception of the law
that underestimates the significance of the courts' remedial function.
Laycock equates law with adjudicating issues of entitlement and fault. But
courts clearly engage in legal activity when they formulate and enforce
injunctions, even though parties frequently cannot claim an entitlement to
any particular remedial solution. Courts make and enforce law even when
they act on indeterminate, nondoctrinal, remedial principles. Their impact
on third parties can be equally or more significant when they act in this
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Laycock, supra note 7, at 1021-23.
Id. at 1013-14.
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 758.
Id. at 766.
Laycock, supra note 7, at 1013.
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nonadjudicatory role. Indeed, participation may well play the most significant role in disciplining and legitimizing judicial involvement when doctrinal considerations do not purport to dictate the result.
Professor Laycock also falls into the trap of equating legally mandated
participation with a full opportunity to litigate. If full adversary process is
not required, participation is purely a matter of politics and convenience
and is neither legally mandated nor worthy of further discussion. This
unquestioned adherence to the adversary model even in remedial decision
making is widely shared and understandable; the adversary model tracks
the assumptions and values basic to the liberal legal model. 33 However,
other forms of participation are possible and crucial to achieving remedial
legitimacy. Courts frequently depart from the adversary model in formulating a structural injunction. The fluidity of the remedial process frees us
to tailor the form of involvement by those whom the decree potentially
affects to the interests at stake and the values that remedial participation
serves. The nature of the third-party's interest should dictate not whether
a third party should participate, but rather the form of participation that is
required.
Third parties claiming that a remedy violates their legal rights, such as
the white firefighters in Martin v. Wilks, present the same types of issues
that courts address in making pure liability determinations. Consequently,
the form of participation will depend on the form of process generally
governing liability determinations. In most cases, liability-type determinations involve adequate participation in the adversary process.34
However, those seeking to influence the scope and conten~ of the
remedy require a form of participation that better suits the demands and
goals of the remedial process. 35 The adversarial model's traditional notions
of party status fail to account for the range of roles and interests at stake at
the remedial stage. The term "party" generally evokes notions of individual
representation by an attorney who conducts discovery, examines witnesses,
presents documentary evidence, submits briefs and arguments to the
factfinder, and appeals unfavorable decisions. These aspects of participation form the image of professional gladiators using every available tool to
win for their clients.

33. See Farina, supra note 14, at 244.
34. Contrary to Professor Fiss' understanding, see Fiss, supra note 2, at 968 n.16, my work
does not propose to eliminate procedural rights associated with the adversary process at the
liability stage, although it recognizes that the arguments I develop for the remedial stage may
have some bearing on liability determinations.
The question of the appropriate form of participation does not determine whether the
requirement of adequate participation can be satisfied through panicipation by representatives, rather than individual participation. As a doctrinal matter, Professor Laycock correctly
observes that the class certification procedure under Rule 23 and the appointment of
guardians ad !item would permit representative litigation. See Laycock, supra note 7, at
1019-20. As a normative matter, the appropriateness of representative rather than individual
participation requires a theory of participation and representation-a topic addressed in Parts
III and IV of this Article.
35. See infra pp. 1002-07.
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The gladiator metaphor does not capture the essence of participation
in the remedial enterprise, which looks more like a web of coordinated,
purposive activities by players with assigned roles and varying interests.
Indeed, the term "party," with its formal, binary connotations, fails to
account for the roles and relationships of participants in the remedial
process. The term "stakeholder" better describes the varying roles of
interested participants in the remedial process. People occupy different
positions in relation to the remedial enterprise. Some participants bear
responsibility for implementing aspects of the project. Some will be the
prime consumers of the product and care deeply about the result. Some
may oppose the project because of its potential adverse impact on their lives
or official duties, and they have the power to prevent its realization.
The extent and significance of stakeholders' relation to the underlying
remedial enterprise dictate the nature of their participation in the remedial
process. For some, adequate participation may require only the opportunity to provide information and express their perspective. Others may need
to be full participants, in the formulation of the remedial plan. A more
complete exposition of the extent and form of remedial participation
requires a normative theory of participation tailored to the public remedial
context. I articulate _such a theory in Part II(B) of this Article.

B.

The Fiction of Formal Finality

Professor Fiss's stated goal in proposing his vicarious interest representation scheme is to preserve the finality and efficacy of the structural
injunction. He purports to accomplish this by formally precluding the
collateral attacks of those whose interests were adequately represented at
the initial proceeding. This solution unravels when considered in relation to
the realities of remedial process.
The success of Professor Fiss's proposal in promoting finality depends
on the identification of a finite number of interests at the outset of the
litigation. Professor Fiss acknowledges that the requirement of providing
notice and an ·opportunity to intervene to interested parties creates the
same practical difficulties he is trying to avoid. 36 His response is to fall back
on the concept of group interests as a way oflimiting the scope of potential
challenges to the adequacy of representation. Professor Fiss's assumption
that third parties' interests are finite and shared suggests that he assesses
interest in relation to the underlying liability claim, rather than in relation
to the interests affected at the remedial stage.
Professor Fiss's solution depends on the capacity to establish ex ante a
set of unchanging shared interests that are limited in number and that
adequately reflect the concerns of all those "similarly situated." Although
Professor Fiss does not elaborate on the standards governing the determination of interests, his scheme presumes the existence of essential, objective, and externally discernable features shared by all members of a group.
This staµc conception of interests might be operative at the liability stage,
during which parties must choose sides on . the question of whether
36. Fiss, supra note 2, at 972-73.
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defendants' conduct violates the law.37 However, it has little relationship to
the interests implicated at the remedial stage of public law litigation.
The tenuousness of Professor Fiss's approach to finality is exemplified
by the example he offers of interest representation. He suggests that the
city of Birmingham might adequately represent the interests of white
firefighters. Laycock attributes Professor Fiss's equation of the city's and the
white firefighters' interests to ideological blinders. 38 I believe that conceptual rather than ideological blinders are at work. Professor Fiss analyzes the
interests of third parties with the liability stage in mind. He appears to
assume that both the city of Birmingham and the white firefighters have an
interest in defeating the black firefighters' claim that past discrimination
entitles them to a remedy. This assumption may be flawed in light of the
demographic changes in the city of Birmingham resulting in a black
majority and black leadership in city government. 39
More to the point, Professor Fiss fails to recognize that the dichotomous definition of interests in terms of establishing or defeating liability
breaks down at the remedial stage. There the choice is not win or lose, but
rather how the remedy should proceed. Because of the multiplicity of
choices and values informing those choices,40 interests and incentives that
overlap at the liability stage frequently diverge at the remedial stage. Martin
v. Wilks offers a good illustration of this point. As Professor Sam Issacharoff
pointed out,4 1 once a court establishes liability, the employer's and thirdparty challengers' interests typically conflict. Employers seeking to minimize their exposure to back-pay liability are quite content to sign on to
hiring and promotion preferences for plaintiffs at the expense of white
employees seeking to protect their job security and promotion prospects.
Indeed, the fragmentation of interests at the remedial stage occurs on
both sides of the case. Plaintiffs who are similarly situated with respect to
liability and who occupy identical positions in relation to the organization at
issue, such as parents of school children or black firefighters seeking
promotion, disagree strongly about fundamental questions of policy and
values. 42 For example, in the school desegregation area, the "[d]ispute has
centered on the relative importance of integration, financial resources,
minority control, and ethnic identification in enriching school
37. Even at the liability stage, there is reason to question the validity of a static conception
of interests based on likely party affiliation. As Laycock points out, remedial concerns
frequently drive parties' positions on liability and trial strategy. Moreover, particularly in
public law cases, legal norms and factual determinations are more complex and multifaceted
than the win-lose character the liability model reflects. This disjuncture between adversary
process and the nature of public law conflicts has led some to argue for a more general
restructuring of judicial process. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 14, at 276-77.
38, Laycock, supra note 7, at 1023.
39. See lssacharoff, supra note 8, at 244-45.
40, For a thorough discussion of the conflict of interests that frequently emerges among
class members at the remedial stage, see Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions,
34 Stan L. Rev. 1183, 1189 (1982).
41. Issacharoff, supra note 8, at 241-47.
42. See Derrick A. Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale LJ. 470,471 (1976); Rhode, supra note 40, at 1184.
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environments."43 Thus, Professor Fiss's assumption that members of a
group are fungible and hold similar perspectives on the remedy ignores
fundamental cleavages within groups about value choices underlying
particular remedial strategies.
Thus, interests viewed from a remedial perspective frequently diverge
from those of the parties to the liability determination; moreover, these
diverging interests may be difficult to ascertain in advance of implementation. The fluidity of remedial interests and lack of clear guidelines
concerning the types of interests requiring separate representation further
increase the likelihood of challenges by stakeholders excluded from participating in remedial proceedings. Indeed, in response to my observation that
interests at the remedial stage are not predetermined or finite, Professor
Fiss proposes to introduce a second round of notice ~nd potential challenges to the decree at the remedial stage.44 This concession opens.the door
to subsequent challenge of remedial decrees by all those whose interests do
not coincide with those of the designated representative. Thus, Fiss's
vicarious interest representation solution buys a marginal increase at best in
formal finality.
There is a deeper problem with Professor Fiss's approach to achieving
finality and efficacy. Professor Fiss discusses finality as if it could be
achieved by the entry of a binding judgment insulated from collateral
attack. This view corresponds to traditional conceptions of finality in
adjudication involving a remedy that is self-executing. However, in structural injunction litigation, the issuance of a decree is only the first step in a
process that continues until the defendants actually implement the
. injunction.45 Decrees are continually subject to both formal and informal
challenge. Certainly the collateral bar rule in effect at the time did not deter
the white firefighters in Martin v. Wilks from filing a challenge. Even if third
parties may not directly challenge the validity of a decree, they may seek to
intervene to modify a decree based on changed circumstances.46 Particularly if the court did not foresee the impact of a remedial provision when it
first adopted the decree, third parties' capacity to challenge its fairness and
effectiveness through modification presents a considerable limitation on
the finality achieved.
The fatal flaw in Professor Fiss's approach to achieving finality is his
failure to take into account the capacity of third parties to challenge decrees
through informal resistance. Unlike liability and damage determinations,
finality in the structural injunction context requires implementation, and
implementation depends on obtaining the. cooperation of third parties
responsible for or in a position to block it. Courts have recognized this
important distinction between liability and remedy in articulating the
standard used to determine the adequacy of injunctive relief: "[A] district
43. Rhode, supra note 40, at 1189.
44. Fiss, supra note 2, at 972-73.
45. See Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies ofJudicial Intervention
in Prisons, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 805, 807 (1990).
46. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rufo, 112 S. Ct. 748, 752 (1992).
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court's remedial plan is to be judged by its effectiveness."47 Effectiveness
requires actually changing behavior and conditions to conform to a stated
norm or standard. Aspirations and agreements cannot substitute for actions
in the remedial context. For this reason, courts have been willing to
consider the problem of white flight in determining an appropriate remedy
in school desegregation cases, even though the same considerations are
irrelevant to liability.48
Exclusion of stakeholders from the remedial process frequently backfires as a way of achieving prompt and effective relief, and sometimes
results in lengthy or permanent postponement of implementation. The
concerns that prompt stakeholders to challenge a remedy exist whether or
not the court acknowledges them. An approach that fails to confront
disagreements with a proposed remedial approach by those who must live
with a remedy offers no vehicle for dealing c~nstructively with predictable
efforts to prevent its implementation. Indeed, it may encourage informal
and subversive challenges to judicial remedies, sucli as adopting narrow
and formalistic interpretations of the order or developing administrative
end-runs that neutralize the impact of the court's mandate. 49 These
responses frustrate efforts to achieve compliance and prolong judicial
involvement.
For example, in the St. Louis school desegregation case, the parties
excluded representatives of the state of Missouri-the primary source of
funding for the desegregation plan-from the negotiations. The State
subsequently objected to the settlement agreement and became a major
obstacle to compliance.50 In the employment context, exclusion of white
workers from participation in litigation leading to affirmative action plans
has triggered protracted litigation challenging court decrees51 and has
exacerbated racial tension within the workplace. 52 Consider the position of
black supervisors faced with the task of managing white workers co~mitted
to undermining court ordered integration of the workforce by engaging in
informal harassment, refusing to comply with their directives, or interfering with their work performance.ss
47. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971).
48. See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale LJ. 585, 642 (1983).
49. Sturm, supra note 45, at 870-71.
50. D. Bruce La Pierre, Voluntary Interdistrict School Desegregation in St. Louis: The
Special Master's Tale, 1987 Wis. L. Rev. 971, 997 n.89, 1028.
51. lssacharoff, supra note 8, at 196-97.
52. Studies have documented an increase in racial tension and perceived morale problems
when companies promote minority or female workers to supervisory and managerial positions
pursuant to an affirmative action plan. See, e.g., Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and
White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal 117 (1992) ("There is also the worry that blacks who are
promoted to supervisory positions may not obtain the best performance from white subordinates, who may be resentful if not actually resistant."); Herbert R. Northrup &John A. Larson,
The Impact of the AT&T-EEO Consent Decree 78-79 (1981).
53. Cases involving the promotion of women to positions traditionally held by men vividly
document this kind of harassment. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara County,
480 U.S. 616, 624 n.5 (1987); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D.
Fla. 1991).
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Thus, Professor Fiss's formalistic approach to preserving the finality of
structural injunctions necessarily fails. At the remedial stage, formal
procedural solutions cannot achieve finality in the face of profound social
and legal controversy. The cooperation and participation of third parties is
frequently crucial to achieving a final remedial resolution. The legitimacy
and effectiveness of structural injunctions depend on developing a theory
of participation that proceeds from this understanding of the public
remedial context.

II.

RETHINKING REMEDIAL PARTICIPATION

Determination of the appropriate extent of participation by interested
stakeholders presupposes some implicit or explicit theory of participation.
What values underlie the concern to afford stakeholders an opportunity to
influence a particular decision? Although Professor Fiss does not explicitly
set forth a theory of participation, he does attempt to justify his proposal to
limit participation by stakeholders in the remedial process. He argues that
participation values are less significant in remedial decision making and
that values such as finality and efficacy trump any claim for participation.
He embraces uncritically the traditional conception of participation embodied in Chief Justice Rehnquist's notion of assuring individuals their "day in
court." His approach fails to articulate a coherent theory of participation
that accounts for the relationship between autonomy and group status and
that fulfills the goals and demands of public remedial decision making. His
formalistic solution also fails to satisfy the precise goals of remedial efficacy
that lead him to compromise the participation values he holds dear.
Professor Fiss accepts the two values underlying participation in the
adversary system: individual dignity and promoting accurate decision
making.54 He argues that the dignity value is less significant in the
structural injunction context and that the instrumental value can be
compromised in the interest of preserving the structural injunction's
efficacy. Both arguments ignore the significance of participation in achieving remedial efficacy' and legitimacy.
A. Instrumental Values of Participation
Professor Fiss attempts to justify copipromising the value of participation by downplaying the significance of the instrumental values of
achieving accurate and effective remedial decisions. He suggests that
because we may value individual participation in structural litigation "only
to serve instrumental rather than dignitary ends," it "loses some of its
force." 55 He does not explain this ranking of process values. It may reflect
dissatisfaction with a process model that ignores nonpositivist, intrinsic
values of dignity and legitimacy which legal processes might further.5 6 It
may reflect a skepticism, which I share, qf the merits of the balancing
approach that characterizes much recent due process jurisprudence.
54. Fiss, supra note 2, at 978.
55. Id.
56. See Mashaw, supra note 14, at 104.
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However, it is important to look beyond formal doctrine in assessing
the instrumental role of participation. Accuracy and effectiveness are
important attributes of fair and legitimate decision making. 57 Many scholars of due process theory challenge the view that intrinsic values trump
instrumental concerns in the due process calculus, and some consider
participation's instrumental value more defensible than dignitary
concerns. 58 Indeed, Professor Fiss has argued that participation, albeit by
spokespeople for a group, plays a crucial role in legitimizing the role of the
court in the structural reform context by enabling a special kind of m.oral
dialogue between the judge and the litigants.59
Moreover, Professor Fiss's entire justification for departing from a
deeply held commitment to participation is an instrumental one-to
preserve the efficacy and finality of the structural injunction. Implicit in
this concern for efficacy is an acknowledgment of a distinctive characteristic
of the remedial stage: the importance of implementation to remedial
success and legitimacy. The instrumental character of structural injunctions
distinguishes them from liability determinations and elevates the importance of instrumental participation values at the remedial stage of public
law remedies. Thus, Professor Fiss's acknowledgment of the practical
significance of participation to remedial efficacy6° is fatal to his claim that
participation should be sacrificed in the name of remedial efficacy.
Because the goal of public law remedies is to change the behavior and
conditions of individuals and institutions, participation serves functions at
the remedial stage that do not pertain to liability determinations. The
participation values germane to public remedial decision making must take
into account the importance of implementation, which usually requires
cooperation by those who must implement and live with the decree. One
cannot determine who should participate or how to participate in structural
injunctions without a full understanding of the participation values implicated by the process of formulating and implementing a decree.
First, participation plays a crucial role in promoting cooperation with
the remedy.6 1 Direct involvement influences the participants to accept the
57. See Farina, supra note 14, at 213 ("Government could be said to act arbitrarily or
unfairly when it harms the individual on the basis of a careless or unsound assessment of the
facts of his case.").
58. See supra note 14.
59. Fiss, supra note 15, at 12-14. In The Forms of Justice, Professor Fiss treats separately
the issue of participation and individualism. He identifies participation in a dialogue requiring
ajudge to listen and respond as a structural characteristic crucial to the court's legitimacy as
an expositor of public values. However, he criticizes the view that insists on individual
participation as the only form preserving the court's capacity to engage in dialogue. Although
Professor Fiss does not develop a theory of group participation and representation, he does
recognize that the issue of determining the adequacy of representation is a difficult one, and
that participation by an individual sharing objective characteristics is not necessarily enough.
This insight is lost in Professor Fiss's uncritical embrace of vicarious interest representation, as
articulated in The Allure of Individualism.
60. Fiss, supra note 2, at 968.
61. See E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice 94
(1988); Lawrence Susskind & Jeffrey Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse: Consensual Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes 27 (1987); Sturm, supra note 9, at 1393.
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results. Research supports the conclusion that broad participation by
affected parties enhances the perceived legitimacy and fairness of the
result, and this also increases their willingness to cooperate.62
Second, participation serves an integrative function of identifying the
group of actors responsible for remedying a problem and involving those
actors in the problem-solving enterprise. 63 Often, no such opportunity to
mobilize a concerted effort to address social problems exists apart from the
remedial process. Through discussion, actors can learn their relationship to
the problem underlying the litigation and their potential role in addressing
the problem. Individuals who are part of a group affected by the remedy
can actively address the issues necessary to eliminate the problems causing
the legal violation. 64
Third, participation produces better substantive outcomes by producing a dialogue among actors with different perspectives on the causes of the
underlying problem and the impact and feasibility of proposed solutions.
Participation affords an opportunity to obtain and synthesize these varying
perspectives and insights, and shapes the views of both the participants and
the decision maker.65
Finally; participation serves an educational function by informing
those responsible for implementation about obstacles and potential solutions to problems. Participation also educates the plaintiffs about the
operation of complex institutions and the skills and approaches necessary to
bring about change.66

B. Dignitary· Theory and Public Remedial Process
Professor Fiss embraces the importance of preserving "the dignity and
worth of the individual" as intrinsic to participation.and entitled to greater
solicitude than the instrumental value of "ensuring that courts are presented with the facts and issues in the sharpest possible terms." 67 He must
then justify his willingness to compromis~ these fundamental process
values. He does so by minimizing their importance in the structural
injunction context. Professor Fiss asserts that dignity values do not come
62. See Lind & Tyler, supra note 61; John W. Thibaut & Laurens Walker, Procedural
Justice: A Psychological Analysis 94 (1975); Richard F. Elmore, Organizational Models of
Social Program Implementation, 26 Pub. Pol'y 185, 213-15 (1978).
63. See Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory 33 (1970) (discussing the
integrative function of participation).
64. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 589,
610-23 (1986).
·
65. See Farina, supra note 14, at 271 ("If knowledge is situated in context and contingent
upon perspective, then a decisionmaker cannot learn to use her power wisely unless she listens
to those who are affected by her decisions."). Farina suggests that this interactive exchange in
which "knowledge, desires and values are created" serves both instrumental and intrinsic
values. The responsibility to communicate "would be one of the clearest commitments to
nurturing the personhood of both citizen and government official." Id.
66. See William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 Md. L.
Rev. l, 17-18 (1985); Lucie E. White, Mobilization at the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making
Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 535, 540 (1978-88).
67. Fiss, supra note 2, at 978.
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into play in structural litigation because, unlike the criminal or administrative contexts which single out individuals, structural remedies "are fonvardlooking and the practices of a bureaucratic organization are examined for
the impact on the welfare of a social group."68 His suggestion that we need
not protect dignity values has implications far beyond the issue of thirdparty participation in structural decrees. His reasoning applies with equal
force to class members purportedly represented by a self-selected representative, or a representative selected by the opposing party. Because
structural injunctions involve group interests, we apparently need not
worry about concerns of dignity and autonomy.
Professor Fiss's willingness to jettison dignity as a concern in the
structural injunction context introduces the troubling notion that dignity
no longer matters in a world defined by group status. By conflating the
concepts of individualism and participation, Professor Fiss, like many
dignitary theorists, throws in the towel on a central challenge confronting
theorists and practitioners-how to recognize and respect the dignity and
diversity of individual group members and yet acknowledge commonalities
in perspective, status, and interests. Most process theorists treat autonomy
and dignity as pertaining solely to the individual. When individuals are
defined in relation to groups, autonomy concerns disappear. This analysis
distorts the nature of the relationship between individuals and groups and
the role of group membership in defining and preserving individuals'
autonomy and sense of self.69
The task of constructing a full-blown dignitary theory that accounts
for group status and remedial decision making is an ambitious one which
exceeds the parameters of this Article. I will, however, sketch out the basis
for my critique of Professor Fiss's treatment of dignitary values in the
structural injunction context and offer some preliminary thoughts on the
direction such a group dignitary theory might take.
Professor Fiss does not explain his claim that dignity values drop out
when the potential harm caused by state action affects a group. To
understand and assess this claim, it is necessary to lay out the concerns
underlying dignitary theory and assess their vitality in the structural
injunction context. At the heart of dignitary theory is the concern ·that
"[g]ovemment should deal fairly and humanely with people, especially
when it contemplates harming them." 70 Professor Fiss's distinction between
structural remedies and the criminal and administrative contexts may rest
on the assumption that the only government action which threatens serious
harm is intentional conduct directed at an individual. But this argument
ignores the lessons of Professor Fiss's own work that harm to individuals in
the modem, bureaucratic state frequently results from conditions and
68. Id.
69. See Stephen Ellman, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and
Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 Va. L. Rev.
1103, 1122-24 (1992). This redefinition of individual identity as a dynamic and interactive
conception that evolves in relation to others is an important insight offered by feminist theory.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 22.
70. Farina, supra note 14, at 214.
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practices embedded in institutional structures. These harms are no less
serious than those resulting from action specifically targeting an individual.
Remedial action may profoundly and adversely affect the status of individual members of a group, without a decision imposing liability which
intentionally alters the status of an individual. Indeed, when judicial action
imposes costs on stakeholders who bear no legal responsibility for plaintiffs'
injuries, there is arguably a greater need for some form of participation in
the formulation of a remedy to preserve judicial legitimacy.
Another aspect of dignitary theory posits that those similarly situated
should be treated the same and that no one's interests should be ignored or
minimized in favor of similarly situated persons. 71 This concern, which
relates to basic notions of fairness, assumes particular significance in
remedial decision making, where decisions explicitly depend on value
choices that are not dictated by universal, legally-determined norms.
Because group members are likely to disagree about these value choices,
the specter of unfairness looms over any process that does not provide
access to those with differing views or at least justify the preferential
position of those with access. Professor Fiss's vicarious interest representation scheme does neither.
Professor Fiss appears most troubled by the application to structural
injunctions of dignity theory's basic moral commitment to the preservation
of the individual's capacity as an autonomous moral agent. He assumes that
this value demands full adversary process afforded to each affected
individual and concludes that this requirement would be fatal to the
structural injunction. He accepts liberal legal theory's characteristic definition of the individual's relation to groups and to the state, namely,
essentially separate, fully formed individuals who seek to further their
interests in opposition to those of the group or the community. 72 He seems
to argue that, because the functional unit in structural injunctions involves
groups rather than individuals, autonomy concerns are not relevant.
Professor Fiss overstates the group character of structural remedies.
His approach suggests the existence of groups that self-consciously identify
and function as distinct entities. Often, this is not the case. Groups are
frequently artificial creations of the litigation that may or may not comprise
a homogeneous community of relevant interests or have access to a
mechanism for reconciling differences of perspective. Ironically, Professor
Fiss seems to accept a principle ofremedial homogeneity that automatically
equates a group's interests with a monolithic, predetermined remedy.73 Yet,
he is among the most eloquent critics of this formalistic approach to public
law remedies. Individuals who may share all relevant characteristics for
purposes of determining liability are not a monolithic group for purposes
of their remedial interests. Structural remedies frequently affect individuals
differently, and group members often disagree concerning the best reme71. See Mashaw, supra note 14, at 173.
72. See Farina, supra note 14, at 241, 249.
73. Robert Bone names and subscribes to this principle of remedial homogeneity. He is
also an advocate of virtual representation in public law litigation. See Bone, supra note 11, at
265.
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dial approach to further their interests. Conflict over the remedy within
groups and among those occupying different positions is inevitable, and
requires structures for mediating between individual and group status.
Furthermore, in some cases implementation requires that courts
individualize public law remedies. This is certainly true in the employment
context because the remedy involves allocating particular jobs or benefits to
particular individuals. Public law remedies often involve the distribution of
resources, jobs, prison cells, and other benefits that require individual
allocation to group members. Thus, strong parallels exist between Professor Fiss's prototype for due process protection-an individual facing an
administrative hearing-and an individual facing the implementation stage
of a remedial decree. In the administrative law context, the legislature
makes the group determinations; in the structural injunction context, the
court does so through the formulation of the decree. In both cases, the
court must consider the implications of group-based classifications for
individual members of those groups.
There is a more fundamental problem with Professor Fiss's assumption that dignitary concerns drop out when the interests at stake are
common to a group. The individual does not disappear as a moral agent
because of interests shared with a group. The dichotomy between individual and group is a false one. Individuals frequently define their identity in
relation to a group, and individual autonomy is at least partially a function
of group status. Recognition of the group's interests constitutes an important aspect of individual dignity. Moreover, individual and group interests
interact. In many ca~es the group does not have clearly-defined, preexisting, and shared interests; the group's identity and interests only
emerge from conflict and consensus among group members.
The recognition of the continuing significance of dignitary theory for
group interests and public remedial process poses a challenge to the
prevailing mode of participation in judicial decision making-the adversary
process. According to Professor Fiss, the adversary process in its current
form presents a stark choice between insisting on an unmanageable form of
adversary participation by each affected individual, or limiting participation in the adversary process to vicarious representatives who are neither
selected by nor accountable to those they purport to represent. 14
There is an additional, more general problem posed by dignitary
theory: How can the commitment to dignity be reconciled with the process
of mandating participation by the government? As Michelman puts it:
[I]t can be argued that ~ due process entitlement . . . cannot
convey the nonformal, the interpersonal meanings of revelation
and participation ... because an official whose explan~tions have
been requisitioned by someone who assertedly owns these elements
74. As Professor Laycock points out in his response to The Allure of Individualism,
Professor Fiss ignores the potential for class action devices to provide a structure for moving
from individual to group participation. Laycock, supra note 7, at 1014. However, Laycock does
not address the failure of current class action theory or practice to satisfy basic concerns of
participation or to satisfy the participation values operative at the remedial stage of public ,aw
litigation.
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of his behavior just will not be engaging in the kinds of acts which
carry the interpersonal meanings that (possibly) we yearn for.75
Cynthia Farina offers a partial response to this concern by criticizing its
implicit equation of individuals and government actors and reconceptualizing the status of government participants to include the responsibilities
associated with assuming official status, including the duty to deal fairly
with citizens. 76 She also links this potential failure of dignitary theory to the
limitations of the adversary model of party participation. "Courts preside
over [these] hostilities, channeling the adversaries through rituals which, if
conducted properly, result in victory without violence." 77
Indeed, the type of party participation contemplated by the adversary
model-indirect and formal submissions controlled by lawyers-seems
inconsistent with all of the participation values relevant to the public
remedial process. It does not promote effective communication, acceptance
of legal norms, identification with the remedial enterprise, or knowledge of
the dynamics of institutional reform. In fact, adversary participation tends
to produce the opposite effect: hostility and resistance. 78 Lawyers' control
over the process detracts from the client's sense of autonomy and responsibility. Similarly, the stylized interaction and win-lose character of ·the
adversary process stymies the exchange and integration of multiple perspectives necessary to produce effective and fair remedial decisions. 79
To meet this challenge, it is necessary to rethink the forms of
participation that developed with purely individual concerns in mind. The
structural injunction provides an appropriate and realistic context for
developing alternative forms of participation that will realize dignitary
values. The finding of liability or consent which predicates courts' remedial
activity removes any lingering doubt concerning the duty of government
officials to participate in the remedial process. Practitioners have already
begun experimenting with consensual forms of decision making that hold
more promise as a foundation for a new model of remedial participation.so
Informality now characterizes much remedial decision making and implementation, and affords the opportunity for more inclusive forms of
participation. Context dictates the content of the structural injunction, and
75. Michelman, supta note 14, at 157.
76. Farina, supra note 14, at 250-51.
77. Id. at 249.
78. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute Settlement
and Rulemaking, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 637, 660 (1976) ("The prospect of subjection to [an adverse
judgment] coupled with the lack of control over the process leading up to the judgment, tends
to generate a state of tension and to drive the disputants irreconcilably apart."); William L. F.
Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 63,
70-71 (1974) (noting alienating affect of adversary process); Sturm, supra note 9, at 1364,
1394-95.
79. Susan M. Olson, Clients and Lawyers: Securing the Rights of Disabled Persons 140
(1984) ("Norms oflegal advocacy inhibit client autonomy and responsibility by imposing the
authority of a supposedly neutral expert on the client."); Eisenberg, supra note 78, at 658-60.
80. Sturm, supra note 9, at 1365-76 (describing forms of remedial practice that deviate
substantially from the formal adjudicatory model, including the bargaining model, the
legislative or administrative hearing model, the expert remedial formulation model, and the
consensual remedial formulation model).
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the necessity of constructing a remedy anew in each context permits the
development of a process that reconciles the concern for individual
autonomy with the group nature of the problem. Indeed, the remedial
stage could serve as a laboratory for rethinking the adversary process and
the nature and adequacy of participation more generally.
The challenge is to develop a form of participation that can capture
the dynamic relationship between the individual and the group. This task
requires a discussion of the role of representation in a remedial theory of
participation.

III.

REPRESENTATION, PARTICIPATION, AND PUBLIC REMEDIAL PROCESS

The previous section argues that participation plays a crucial role in
enabling fair, legitimate, and effective remedial decision making. It also
identifies a dilemma arising from the importance ofremedial participation:
How can participation be achieved in situations affecting the interests of
diverse groups of people?
The prospect of unwieldy, unpredictable, and unending involvement
by innumerable individuals prompts Professor Fiss to shift from a right of
participation to a right of vicarious interest representation. To accomplish
this, he offers two moves: first, from individual to interest as the locus of
participation, and second, from direct to vicarious symbolic participation.
He leaves intact the adversary form that participation takes in traditional
adjudication and simply proposes to limit access to participation to vicarious
representatives of group interests. The court determines the adequacy of
interest representation at the "initial proceeding" and "failure to challenge
the adequacy of representation at that stage would foreclose any subsequent attacks on the decree at all."81 Group members need not participate
in the identification of their representative, and Professor Fiss's proposal
assigns the designated representative no special responsibility to the group
he or she purportedly represents. ,
Professor Fiss's argument for shifting the locus of inquiry from
individuals to groups is compelling, and builds on the insight of his
previous work that the victims of illegal social conditions can best be
identified by their status within an organization or their membership in a
group. 8 2 However, Professor Fiss fails to examine the relationship between
participation and representation. If, as he argues, participation values drop
out in structural injunctions, what is the basis for an individual's claim to
representation? Professor Fiss would likely respond that representation is a
compromise justified by the decreased importance of participation in
structural injunctions and the significance of the substantive rights at stake.
This response presumes that representation bears some relationship
to participation. But Professor Fiss's discussion of vicarious interest representation offers no explicit theory of representation. He does not define
what makes someone "representative" of those he or she purports to
81. Fiss, supra note 2, at 972.
82. Fiss, supra note 15, at 18-19.
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represent. Furthermore, he provides no indication of the role a representative should play and how "representation" will satisfy any of the values
served by participation.
Professor Fiss's vicarious interest representation scheme does implicitly choose a theory of representation. It clearly eschews an agency
approach, which depends on advance authorization by the constituents to
act in their behalf.s3 Under Professor Fiss's scheme. "raln individual can be
bound by the action of someone purporting to be his ·o~ her representative
even though that individual had no say whatsoever over the selection of
that representative, indeed, might not have even known of the appointment or that he or she was being represented."84 Vicarious interest
representation also rejects an accountability view of representation, which
depends on holding the representative accountable for what she does. 85
Nor does Professor Fiss embrace a functional conception of representation
that offers a view of the goals or purposes pursued on behalf of
constituents. 86 He does not prescribe any particular role for the representative.
In Professor Fiss's scheme, "[t]he right of representation is a collective,
rather than an individual right, because it belongs to a group of persons
classed together by virtue of their shared interests."87 "Representativeness"
consists of possessing common characteristics or interests. This language
reflects a descriptive conception of representation; individuals who share
identical interests with other group members can serve as proxies or
exemplars for each group member. 88 "The representative does not act for
others; he 'stands for' them, by virtue of a correspondence or connection
between them, a resemblance or reflection."89 By pursuing their selfinterest, these representatives will speak for absent group members by
conveying information about the group and taking positions that reflect
group characteristics.
The vicarious interest representation scheme contains the shortcomings typical of descriptive representation theories. Its viability depends on
a tight correspondence between the characteristics of the representative
and the group. It is premised on the existence of a group defined by a static
and uniform set of interests that can be discerned by the application of
judicially crafted standards. If this monolithic group exists, any individual
83. See Hannah Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 43 (1967).
84. Fiss, supra note 2, at 974.
85. Pitkin, supra not~ 83, at 55.
86. Id. at 114-15.
87. Fiss, supra note 2, at 972.
88. See Pitkin, supra note 83, at 61; Martha Minow, From Class Actions to Miss Saigon:
The Concept of Representation in the Law, 39 Clev. St. L. Rev. 269, 281 (1991). "Descriptive
representation" in the electoral context is representation by culturally and physically similar
persons. See Pitkin, supra, at 60-91; Barnard Grofman, Should Representatives Be Typical of
Their Constituents?, in Representation and Redistricting Issues 97 (Barnard Grofman ed.,
1982). For a critique of this concept of descriptive representation in the voting rights context,
see Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black
Electoral Success, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1077, 1102-09 (1991).
89. Pitkin, supra note 83, at 61.
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member of the group can serve as group representative, so the arbitrariness
of the choice loses significance. But this assumption of homogeneity
frequently does not pertain to groups at the remedial stage of public law
litigation in which those with identical formal characteristics have different
conceptions of their interests.90 It reduces members of a group with diverse
perspectives and interests to a fictional, monolithic entity. Individuals who
do not accept or identify with the perspective or positions articulated by
their self-selected representative are frozen out of the process.
Professor Fiss's approach also assumes that interests exist and persist
independent of the process used to identify and select remedial alternatives.
However, the interaction with others concerning the remedy may influence
or even define the interests and positions of participants in the remedial
dialogue. Sustained dialogue with people of differing perspectives shapes
those perspectives and opens up the possibility of finding common
interests.91 For this reason, it is particularly difficult to determine the range
and commonality of interests among group members at the outset of the
litigation, before the participants have proposed the range of possible
remedial approaches.
Moreover, Professor Fiss offers no basis to determine whether an
individual's interests are "similar or comparable" to those of a group
already participating in a dispute, or sufficiently significant and distinct to
warrant separate representation. Professor Fiss never actually identifies the
types of interests that entitle a group to distinct representation. He simply
asserts that there are groups with common interests justifying aggregate
rather than individual participation. He assumes the existence of a neutral,
externally defined standard for determining shared interests. But determining whether individual interests diverge depends on a frame of
reference concerning the considerations relevant to the issue at hand.9 2
How do we know whether asserted differences in perspective are sufficiently important and relevant to warrant independent representation?
Professor Fiss's treatment of the city's claim to represent the interests of the
white firefighters in Martin v. Wilks is illustrative of the problem. 93 He does
not give us any externally defined standard for determining whether the
city was or could be a descriptive representative of the white firefighters. I

90. See supra pp. 999-1001.
91. Roger Fisher & William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving
In 42 (2d ed. 1991) ("In many negotiations ... a close examination of the underlying interests
will reveal the existence of many more interests that are shared or compatible than ones that
are opposed."); Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10, 72
(1987).
92. As Hannah Pitkin noted, "As soon as the correspondence is less than perfect, we must
begin to question what sorts of features and characteristics are relevant to action, and how
good the correspondence is with regard to just those features." Pitkin, supra note 83, at 88.
93. Professor Fiss made this point more forcefully in his remarks at the American
Association of Law Schools panel. In response to rather pointed criticism of his uncritical
assumption that the city represented the interests of white firefighters, he qualified his
assertion of identity of interest. Fiss, supra note 2, at 971.
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question whether it is possible or desirable to determine this issue conclusively without a discussion of specific remedial alternatives and their
potential implications.
Once we acknowledge the potential divergence of interest among
group members and the value choices inherent in identifying which
interests matter, the justification for descriptive representation founders.
Descriptive representation may offer one important aspect of representation by striving toward some commonality of perspective and incentives
between representative and constituents. 94 But the definition of "representative" necessarily reflects disputable value choices among competing
conceptions of interest, so the identity of interests between representative
and constituents cannot justify representation.
. This multiplicity of interests at the remedial stage undermines the
validity of Professor Fiss's reliance on Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co. 95 to support the move from individual to interest participation.
Professor Fiss's concept of representation defines the group as those with
"similar or comparable interests." 96 However, the Court in Mullane is
careful to state that "[t]he individual interest does not stand alone but is
identical with that of the class .... Therefore notice reasonably certain to
reach most of those interested in objecting is likely to safeguard the
interests of all, since any objections sustained would inure to the benefit of
all."97 The Court assumes a homogeneity of interest that cannot be simply
transposed to the structural injunction context.
The potential divergence in perspective between a representative and
group members highlights another inadequacy of the descriptive model of
representation. It offers no guidance for the representative's behavior.
Professor Fiss's move from identical to comparable interests is difficult to
justify without a more functional and interactive view of representation that
acknowledges potential differences among group members and the repre94. See Minow, supra note 88, at 284-86.
95. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Professors Fiss and Laycock both rely on Mullane to support their
arguments, and draw opposite conclusions concerning the meaning of the case. Robert Bone
has offered a plausible explanation for this disagreement over the meaning of Mullane. On one
hand, Mullane opens the door to the concept that, at least in some circumstances, adequate
representation may substitute for individual participation to serve other important goals.
Unlike Laycock, I do not read Mullane to rely on the existence of fiduciary responsibilities by
the representative as a basis for this conclusion. Professor Fiss relies on this strand of the
holding. Professor Laycock emphasizes the second strand of Mullane and its progeny, which
implicitly embraces the "day in court" notion of due process and rejects the notion that
representation can substitute for individual participation when it is possible to provide notice.
The Court in Mullane never reconciles these two strands. See Bone, supra note 11, at 216-18.
96. Fiss, supra note 2, at 973. In an earlier draft, Fiss actually cites Mullane for the
proposition that it is sufficient that "notice be given to a substantial number of persons or
groups who have similar or comparable interests."
97. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319. The contrast between Mullane and Martin v. Wilks illustrates
the difference between public and private law remedies first introduced by Abe Chayes. Abe
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976). All of
the beneficiaries of the common trust fund in Mullane share an interest in maximizing their
income and avoiding fraud and waste. This identity of interests does not exist for all presumed
beneficiaries of a public law remedy, such as a school desegregation decree or the consent
decree instituting an affirmative action plan in Martin v. Wilks.
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sentative's responsibility to account for those differences. However, Professor Fiss does not prescribe any fiduciary, trustee, agency, or mediating role
for the group representative. He eschews any mechanism enabling constituents to determine their appropriate group affiliation, to select their
representative, to voice their views, or to hold their "representative"
accountable.
Professor Fiss's vicarious interest representation proposal ~uilds in and
compounds the limitations of the adversary model of participation. The
individual designated as the group representative faces all of the limitations
of adversary process as a form of remedial participation identified earlier in
this Article. 98 Members of the group purportedly represented face dual
insulation from the 'process-from their representative and from the
adversary process.
Thus, Professor Fiss's vicarious interest representation scheme is
unsatisfying as a means of justifying and structuring the move from
participation to representation. Yet, representation is the linchpin for
bridging the individual and the group, for achieving the values served by
participation at the remedial stage. In many contexts, public law remedies
cannot proceed individually because they concern conditions and practices
that will affect others with the same status. Moreover, problems of scale
necessitate the move to some form of representation. Yet, there is a need to
acknowledge the dynamic relationship between the individual and the ·
group, and the contingent and shifting character of group identity.
The task of crafting a more viable approach to representation must
begin with the theory of the goals and values served by remedial participation. At the remedial stage, interests assume a more fluid and dynamic
character, suggesting that a more expansive and process-oriented approach
to interest representation might be necessary to provide adequate representation of the diverse interests implicated by structural injunctions. 99
The theory of remedial participation developed in the previous part
provides a framework for developing a concept of effective representation
in the public remedial context. 100 The goal of achieving the cooperation of
stakeholders in the remedy suggests that the representative must play a
more interactive role in developing a set of group interests, conveying the
group's perspectives, and communicating with the group concerning the
progress of and rationale for remedial decisions. The goals of educating the
participants concerning implementation and integrating them into the
community responsible for the remedy may necessitate active exchange of
information and proposed solutions, particularly with those whose cooperation is essential to remedial success. The goal of achieving dialogue among
those with diverse perspectives supports the necessity of exposing and
confronting conflict, rather than closing it out of the process or using
artificial devices such as majority rule to determine the position of a
particular group.
98. See supra p. 1001.
99. See Minow, supra note 22, at 1894 (advocating process rather than rule-oriented
approach to defining procedural requirements).
100. See supra pp. 995-1002.
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Finally, the concern for dignity suggests that individual group members must have some mechanism for communicating with their representative. This mechanism need not assure each individual participant the
right to control the outcome or even the strategy of the group. Such a level
of control would extend beyond the individual's status in relation to the
group and thus exceed the legitimate expectations of each group member.
At the same time, preserving individual dignity requires some mechanisms
for assuring individual group members t..liat their representative is presenting their views and that their interests do influence the process of remedial
decision making.
This functional theory of representation also dictates the selection of
relevant interests worthy of representation and the designation of individual representatives. Instead of attempting to articulate a universal standard
governing the identification of categories of interested parties, the potential
stakeholders would themselves identify the range of individuals and
organizations potentially affected and the extent of their overlapping
interests. They would also select representatives to participate directly in
the remedial deliberations. These representatives bear the responsibility of
accounting to the group and speaking for the group in the remedial
discussions.101 This approach moves beyond the notion of descriptive
representation underlying Professor Fiss's proposal toward an interactive
and facilitative conception of representation that offers a substantive view
of the representative's function and includes some degree of accountability
and control by group members.
IV.

THE DELIBERATIVE MODEL: A FIRST ATTEMPT TO IMPLEMENT A
REMEDIAL THEORY OF PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION

The remaining and perhaps most formidable task in developing a
theory ofremedial participation and representation concerns its implementation. Is there a form of participation and representation that is both
workable and true to the values and concerns articulated in the previous
sections? I ·argue that the solution to this quandary depends on our
willingness to look beyond the adversary model of dispute resolution.
In a recent article entitled A Normative Theory of Public Law
Remedies, 102 I have offered the deliberative model ofremedial formulation
as one proposal for structuring participation and representation at the
remedial stage of litigation to satisfy the dual concerns of legitimacy and
efficacy. Under this model, the court's role is to structure a deliberative
process whereby stakeholders in a dispute concerning a structural injunction develop a consensual remedial solution using reasoned dialogue. It
also evaluates the adequacy of this process and the remedy it produces.1°3
The stakeholders participate directly in aµ informal but structured process
of exchanging information, brainstorming, and attempting to reach con101. See Sturm, supra note 9, at 1422-24.
102. Sturm, supra note 9.
103. This model builds on the public consensual dispute resolution model articulated by
Susskind & Cruikshank, supra note 61.
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sensus. This process offers the potential to educate the_ parties, develop
working relationships, integrate differing perspectives, and generate creative solutions.
Instead of offering a substantive standard to determine who should
participate in framing the remedy, the deliberative model establishes a
process to identify the individuals, groups, and organizations whose participation is necessary to develop and implement a fair and workable
remedy. If the remedial problem implicates concerns of similarly situated
individuals, the model provides a process for identifying the categories of
interested parties and enabling each group to select a representative
empowered to speak on their behalf. 104 These representatives have no
authorization to act unilaterally on behalf of the group. Rather, they are
charged with the responsibility "to amplify concerns of larger groups, to
carry messages and information to them, and to return with a sense of the
group's willingness to commit to whatever consensus emerges." 105 Thus,
the deliberative model moves beyond descriptive representation to a more
interactive form of representation that enables group members to gain
access to the content of the deliberations, to express their perspectives on
various remedial proposals, and to hold their representatives accountable.
To some, it may sound like heresy or lunacy to look to nonadversarial
processes to realize the values essential to judicial legitimacy. However,
precedents for more dynamic forms of representation and participation
exist in other areas of public law, such as bankruptcy and collective
bargaining. 10 6 Indeed, it is not a coincidence that the precedents urged by
the black firefighters in Martin v. Wilks involve railroad reorganization. 107
Theorists in areas other than judicial process, such as public consensual
dispute resolution and feminist theory, offer useful insights that can direct
our search for an alternative vision of remedial participation.
CONCLUSION

Owen Fiss selected Martin v. Wilks as one of a series of decisions by the
Rehnquist court cutting back on public law remedies. If one takes seriously
104. The model provides for the selection of a third-party facilitator to assist the stakeholders in the deliberative process.
105. Susskind & Cruikshank, supra note 61, at 105. This description of the representative's
role does not resolve the issue of whether the representative ever may depart from the
expressed interests of group members. There may be situations, such as where the interests of
absent group members conflict with those present, in which a representative may be justified
in articulating views not shared by those present. These situations may require the appointment of a guardian ad !item or some other representative of the interests of future
stakeholders. The question also remains whether the representative ever may depart from the
expressed will of the group on the ground that the position held by the group members does
not actually serve the interests of the group. The answer to this dilemma may well depend on
the circumstances of particular cases, such as the capacity. of group members to understand
and express their interests and the extent of consensus among group members. These are
serious issues which warrant further thought. For one commentator's view that lawyers should
determine the interests of the class when a conflict exists between present and future class
members, see David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 347.49 (1988).
106. See Sturm, supra note 9, at 1414 n.317, 1432 n.402.
107. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 765-66.
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the importance of rethinking the value of participation in the structural
injunction context, however, Martin v. Wilks takes on a different meaning.
It offers glimmerings of acknowledgment of the distinctive character of the
remedial process. 108 It recasts the issue of third-party participation as one of
structuring incentives for developing a more robust and contextualized
form of remedial participation that can realize the promise of participation
as a bridge between legitimacy and efficacy.
The theory and form of participation and representation developed in
this Article would go a long way toward preventing the dilemma that faced
the court in Martin v. Wilks. A structure would exist for identifying and
involving all potential stakeholders at the outset of the remedial process,
thus eliminating the issue of who should bear this responsibility. 109 Those
with potential liability-type challenges to the validity of a decree would
receive notification and the opportunity to litigate such claims before the
court enters a decree. The court and the participants would address the
issue of the representativeness of those asserting such claims at the outset
of the remedial process. This would eliminate the incentive for white
firefighters deliberately to sit on the sidelines and then assert individual
challenges if they do notlike the result of the first round oflitigation. It will
also create incentives for plaintiffs to confront and address potential
challenges to the decree, rather than risk subsequent delay, subversion, and
opposition.
Even if the white firefighters lose their liability-type challenge to a
proposed remedy, they would retain the opportunity to participate in
structuring the remedy. However, their participation would be tailored to
satisfy the five remedial values of participation and implemented through
an ·interactive and facilitative form of representation. Participation by
groups such as the white firefighters is essential not only to protecting their
own interests, but to the legitimacy of the judicial enterprise, and to the
integrity and effectiveness of the structural injunction. Professor Fiss's
proposal to limit participation through vicarious interest representation
encourages a subversive response that frequently prevents courts from
achieving their remedial goals. By including competing perspectives, the
remedial process may force the stakeholders to come up with a solution that
has greater long-term potential for maintaining a stable, integrated
workforce. no ,
108. Several other decisions issued by the Rehnquist Court show a remarkable tolerance of
the structural injunction as a fixture of the legal landscape. See, e.g., Inmates of Suffolk County
Jail v. Rufo, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992); Missouri v.Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990); Spallone v. United
States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990).
109. This structure does not resolve the question of who should bear the cost of notice to
stakeholders. There is a compelling argument that because remedial formulation process is the
first stage of the remediation process, those costs should be borne by the defendants as the first
step in eliminating an established legal violation. This Article does not address or resolve that
question, which s_hould be the subject of further study.
110. In Local 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 507, 509 (1986), the Supreme Court
described one success story in Atlanta in which negotiations involving black and white
employees and a public employer produced a workable resolution to a dispute over an
affirmative action plan. In Atlanta, negotiations that involved the interested stakeholders
produced an agreement under which the ci~y expanded the number of promotions it would
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. I have offered one possible approach for structuring remedial participation. I do not claim to have a solution that will work in every context or
that will convince every reader. I am emphasizing the need to fill the gap in
our thinking about public remedial process. Only by moving beyond the
allure of adversary process will we begin to realize the promise of
participation.

make over a shon period of time so that it would promote the same number of officers who
would have obtained promotions under the existing system. Unfortunately, strained relationships between the firefighters and the city of Cleveland prevented a successful resolution of
the dispute in Local 93, illustrating that participation does not ensure a fair and effective
agreement in every situation.

